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AbstrAct
Since December 2008, Sweden has more liberal rules for labor immigration from ‘third coun-
tries’ – countries outside the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) – than 
any other country in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
The introduction of employer-driven labor immigration, motivated by the need to address labor 
shortages, resulted in large inflows of migrants in low-skilled occupations in labor surplus sectors. 
This article examines the situation of the approximately 500 restaurant and cleaning workers 
who were granted work permits in Stockholm in 2012. More than four out of ten labor migrants 
‘switched track’ from asylum seekers, students, or family connection. Every second worker was 
recruited to companies without collective agreements. In several cases, a nationality/ethnic link 
between migrant and employer appears to exist. The reasons why so many low-skilled labor 
migrants in nonseasonal occupations were recruited are discussed. Finally, alternative explana-
tions for the decline of this type of labor migration after 2011 are considered.
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IntrODuctIOn
Sweden is famous for its high union density and collective agreement coverage. However, in the last few decades, the Swedish labor market model has been put under increasing pressure. Union density has declined considerably among blue-
collar workers. The employment gap between native-born and foreign-born residents is 
one of the largest among the European OECD countries (OECD, 2015:69). Considering 
the poor labor market integration of foreign-born residents, a seemingly paradoxical 
labor immigration reform was launched in 2008 making Sweden ‘the most open labor 
migration system among OECD countries’ (OECD, 2011:11).
Prior to the reform, Sweden applied restrictive rules based on labor market tests, 
designed to eliminate temporary bottlenecks and shortages of high-skilled labor. Since 
December 2008, Swedish employers have been free to recruit third-country nation-
als for any occupation and sector. This significantly curtailed trade union influence on 
labor immigration practices. The new migration system relies on the idea that employers 
66 Labor Migration from Third Countries to Swedish Low-wage Jobs Frödin & Kjellberg
recruit third-country nationals only if they cannot find any EU residents to employ. The 
government bill argued that there was no risk that companies would prefer foreign 
workers to domestic labor, because ‘from an employer perspective [it] usually is much 
easier to recruit from Sweden than from third countries, provided that the right skills are 
available within the country’ (Government bill, 2007/2008:147, p. 26). The government 
argued that the ‘main driving force’ for the 2008 reform was the labor shortages that 
could not ‘be filled solely by people living in Sweden or other EEA countries’ (Emilsson 
2016:10).
Berg and Spehar (2013) explain the Swedish labor immigration reform as being the 
result of an unholy alliance between the Green Party, advocating cultural cosmopolitan-
ism and a world without borders, and the four center-right parties seeking to increase 
labor mobility and maximize freedom for employers. The needs of small and medium-
sized enterprises were stressed by the Center Party. In 2002, the five parties, together with 
the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SN), launched a campaign to relax Sweden’s 
strict labor migration policies. The original initiative was taken by SN, which raised the 
question in 2001 and in 2002 presented a concrete proposal that became fundamen-
tal for the continued discussion (Johansson, 2014:108–111). Boräng and Cerna (2017) 
attribute this development to changed power relations between employers and trade 
unions, and diverging views between the blue-collar LO and the white-collar TCO and 
Saco. Due to shortages of graduate engineers and other categories of skilled workers, the 
latter confederations showed a more open attitude to labor immigration than did LO.
Johansson (2014) highlights the diverging interests of employers and unions: a mar-
ket liberal policy aimed at employer control over labor immigration as opposed to a 
restrictive policy to avoid wage dumping. With changed power relations, the employers’ 
perspective became more influential in the parliamentary arena, which was also charac-
terized by power shifts and new coalitions.
In the years following the reform, numerous third-country migrants were recruited, 
not only to shortage occupations but also to low-skilled occupations without labor 
shortages. This prompted OECD to express concern and to call for closer monitoring of 
the reform outcome including the following aspects: 
•    whether the increasing recruitment into low-skilled occupations was related to 
 regional shortages, for example, in Stockholm;
•    whether companies run by immigrants tended to recruit co-nationals; 
•    the extent to which employers recruiting migrants in surplus occupations had signed 
collective agreements (OECD, 2011:13, 19, 88).
According to the law, the employment conditions of third-country labor migrants must 
not be below the minimum level of the collective agreement or the praxis in the sector. 
In contrast to most other EU countries, Sweden has neither statutory minimum wages, 
nor any mechanisms to extend collective agreements to whole sectors. This gives trade 
unions a key role in promoting decent employment conditions, but as OECD remarks, 
‘it is difficult for trade unions to play a role in monitoring employers and workplaces not 
covered by collective agreements’ (OECD, 2011:126). The informal veto previously held 
by unions was used to ‘block recruitment by firms in which they had little oversight’.
Part of the demand for labor immigrants is explained by a shortage of domestic labor 
available for high-skilled jobs such as computer specialists and for low-skilled seasonal 
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jobs such as berry-pickers. However, a third category of labor immigrants was recruited 
in large numbers to low-skilled jobs in surplus occupations. Of the 16,500 work permits 
granted in 2012 (including extensions), ‘elementary occupations’ accounted for 7200 (of 
which 5700 were berry pickers and planters) and highly skilled professionals for 6100. 
In 2016, the latter accounted for half of the work permits. 
In recent decades, the number of low-skilled and low-paid service jobs has grown 
in the increasingly polarized Swedish labor market, but the competition to get such jobs 
is fierce and from an employer perspective ‘the supply of persons available for jobs in 
the low-wage sector has been beneficial’ (Åberg, 2012:21). These jobs are competed for 
not only by persons with low education, students, and other young people, but also by 
highly educated individuals who have failed to get jobs corresponding to their level of 
education. Furthermore, a rapidly growing share of the low-paid service jobs is held by 
foreign-born residents.
AIms, hYpOthEsEs, DAtA, AnD mEthODs
The primary objective of this article is to explain why so many third-country nationals 
were recruited to sectors characterized by high unemployment and a large share of low-
skilled jobs. Although the introduction of the new labor migration legislation coincided 
with the financial crisis, a marked influx of labor migrants to the restaurants and clean-
ing sectors occurred in the years following the reform. For this reason, we have chosen 
these sectors for a closer study. 
A first hypothesis is that the new legislation has put third-country labor migrants in 
a considerably more subordinate and vulnerable position than other employees, which 
might make them attractive for employers who seek to exploit this weak position. 
During the first two years of a work permit, the labor migrant is bound to a specific 
employer and occupation. If the migrant loses the job, expulsion from Sweden will fol-
low unless a new job in the same occupation is found within a few months and a new 
work permit is granted. After four years, the labor migrant normally receives a perma-
nent residence permit. In the meantime, the migrant may be prepared to accept worse 
working conditions than promised in the work offer, which is not legally binding. It can 
be argued that the legislation produces such unequal balances of power that the concept 
of unfree labor would be appropriate to describe the position of many third-country 
labor migrants. In addition, the power relations between employers and labor migrants 
are influenced by the weak market position of unskilled workers in sectors distinguished 
by high unemployment. The risk of being exploited could be expected to be greatest in 
companies without collective agreements. In such situations, unions have virtually no 
ability to control working conditions. Furthermore, Sweden has no equivalence to the 
Norwegian Labor Inspection Authority, which has significant powers to inspect working 
and employment conditions. 
By its very construction, the 2008 labor migration legislation put unskilled labor 
migrants in surplus occupations into a vulnerable position. Therefore, the absence of a 
collective agreement could be expected to make this category of workers more vulnerable 
to abuse than other foreign-born workers, not to mention native Swedes. Consequently, 
the coverage of collective agreements among unskilled labor migrants is particularly 
important to explore. The sectors chosen for our study – restaurants and cleaning – are 
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also characterized by rates of unionization far below the Swedish average, which may 
further restrict the prospects of trade unions to control the employment conditions of 
labor migrants. 
Our second hypothesis for explaining why so many labor migrants from non-EU/
EEA countries were recruited into surplus occupations is that, contrary to the expecta-
tions in the government bill mentioned above, employers with non-EU/EEA background 
may have preferred using transnational networks to recruit nondomestic workers. In the 
Swedish restaurant sector, approximately every second employer was born abroad. An 
indicator of the importance of social networks is the migrants’ statements concerning 
how they had obtained knowledge of job vacancies. 
Our third hypothesis is that the demand for work permits from different kinds of 
track changers accounts for a significant inflow of labor migrants from third countries. 
The 2008 legislation made it possible to ‘change track’ from asylum seeker to labor 
migrant after the application for asylum was rejected, provided that the migrant had 
worked for at least six months. Taking into account its relatively small size, Sweden has 
received more asylum seekers than almost all other EU countries. Former students can 
also apply to change their track to labor migrants. 
Fourthly, it is possible that some third-country labor migrants in the restaurant and 
cleaning sectors were recruited to shortage occupations where skilled cooks may be the 
most prominent example. 
These four hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. For example, the vulnerability 
of labor migrants might be reinforced when combined with a high demand for work 
permits from former asylum seekers, as these persons might be prepared to accept bad 
working conditions to get a chance to remain in or return to Sweden. Employers of the 
same nationality as the labor migrant may not only function as support in a foreign 
country but may also increase the vulnerability of the migrant. 
The large number of work permits issued in the Stockholm restaurant and cleaning 
sectors in 2012 caused us to choose this city for closer examination. Stockholm is of 
additional interest owing to its lower union density and coverage of collective agree-
ments than in the rest of Sweden. However, the rate of unemployment is below the 
Swedish average. 
To test our hypotheses, we carried out a detailed primary study of all new work per-
mits granted in 2012 in the selected sectors in Stockholm municipality. Using the almost 
500 labor migrant dossiers in the archives of the Swedish Migration Agency, business 
registers, and trade union registers of collective agreements, we constructed a database 
to record the migrants, the companies which had recruited them, the employment condi-
tions offered, and the opinions of trade unions.
Among other things, we investigated the size and character of the recruiting firms, 
the degree to which they had signed collective agreements, trade union approval rates 
of the labor permits, the degree to which migrants and employers have links to the 
same country of origin, and whether the labor migrants were former asylum seekers 
who had changed track. Finally, we examined the occupations specified in the work 
permits.
As is shown below, the number of new labor permits granted to third-country 
migrants in the restaurant and cleaning sectors increased up to and including 2011 
and began to decline in 2012. Tentative explanations for this trend and for the increase 
in 2017 are presented. The article begins with an overview and analysis of the labor 
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immigration trends in Sweden between 2009 and 2017. We then present the results of 
our primary study. Finally, we make a comprehensive analysis of the findings.
thE IncrEAsE AnD DEclInE In WOrK pErmIts – AnD 
nEW IncrEAsE
The number of new work permits in the restaurant and cleaning industries more than 
doubled during the years immediately following the labor immigration reform (Table 1). 
Thereafter, the upward trend was broken, decreasing from about 2900 new permits in 
2011 to about 1100 in 2016. In Stockholm, the decline was even sharper. One possible 
explanation is that in January 2012 and August 2014, the Migration Agency introduced 
stricter controls due to the discovery of several cases of labor migrant exploitation.
In 2012, the number of granted permits was still quite large, but this can be 
explained by backlogs in case management; there was a lag before the stricter rules had 
table 1  Granted new work permits in some occupational groups in Sweden, Stockholm county, 
and Stockholm municipality, 2009–2017






257 546 800 570 470 553 581 400 4177 –400 (–50%) 782
Cooks etc. 769 1048 1327 862 831 865 740 537 6979 –790 (–60%) 849
Restaurant employees 
total
1026 1594 2127 1432 1301 1418 1321 937 11,156 –1190 (–56%) 1631
Cleaners 295 488 799 554 397 263 219 197 3302 –602 (–75%) 515




161 325 439 265 221 226 260 168 2065 –271 (–62%) 403
Cooks etc. 280 366 515 307 243 230 206 172 2319 –343 (–67%) 283
Restaurant employees 
total
441 691 954 572 464 456 466 340 4384 –614 (–64%) 686
Cleaners 220 406 675 420 269 161 141 132 2424 –543 (–80%) 379




108 200 272 174 169 128 184 100 1335 –192 (–71%) 255
Cooks etc. 193 232 307 174 158 143 142 115 1464 –192 (–63%) 194
Restaurant employees 
total
301 432 579 348 327 271 326 215 2799 –364 (–63%) 449
Cleaners 118 181 322 181 96 91 75 61 1125 -261(-81%) 214
Total 419 613 901 529 423 362 401 276 3924 -625(-69%) 663
Source: Swedish Migration Agency.
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an impact. Most work permits granted that year in Stockholm were based on applica-
tions submitted in 2011 and therefore were not covered by the more stringent rules. Out 
of about 2000 new work permits in the restaurant and cleaning sectors, half were issued 
in Stockholm County and one in four in the city of Stockholm. 
The financial crisis might also have contributed to the decline in the number of 
granted work permits, but employment statistics contradict this hypothesis. Unlike 
the situation in Sweden’s export industry, the number of employees in restaurants 
and hotels continued to increase. The cleaning sector was affected very little by the 
economic crisis. 
Another contributory factor appears to be that employers found new means to 
employ third-country migrants already residing in the country at very low costs. There 
are several forms of wage subsidies available for employers who hire unemployed and 
newly arrived immigrants. According to Refslund and Thörnquist (2016), the main 
employer strategy to deal with the fierce competition in the restaurant and cleaning sec-
tors has been to employ domestic workers – including previous immigrants –  subsidized 
through the Public Employment Service. As up to 80% of the wage is paid for by the 
state and wage costs constitute the lion’s share of the total costs for many firms, these 
subsidies create a powerful incentive for employers to employ subsidized labor. In 
the hotel and restaurant industry, the number of granted wage subsidies increased by 
almost 40% between 2011 and 2015.
Despite the strong decline after 2011 in new work permits granted to cleaners, 
food preparation assistants, and cooks, both the number and the share of workers born 
abroad (and who come mostly from non-EU countries) has continued to increase in 
these occupations (Table 2). It is likely that some were asylum seekers with jobs pending 
the decision of the Migration Agency as well as refugees and others who had already 
been granted permanent residence permits.
Labor immigration from non-EU countries after 2011 decreased faster in cleaning 
than in the restaurant sector. Only a few hundred cleaners received new work permits in 
2015 and 2016 (Table 1). However, the share of cleaners born outside EU in the labor 
force has increased markedly, to 40% in 2015, that is, three quarters of all cleaners 
born abroad (Table 2). Between 2011 and 2015, persons born outside EU accounted for 
almost the entire increase of foreign-born cleaners. In contrast to Denmark,  Sweden’s 
inflow of EU labor migrants in cleaning has been comparatively low (Refslund & Thörn-
quist, 2016:67). 
Sweden abstained from transitional rules in the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements. A 
possible explanation for the limited inflow of EU cleaning workers is that many employ-
ers preferred non-EU labor migrants due to their vulnerable position caused by the 
required link to a specific employer and occupation, while EU citizens can move freely 
between employers, occupations, and countries. In addition to the combination of open-
ness and the creation of a vulnerable category of third-country labor migrants, Sweden 
receives more refugees per capita than any other Nordic country. This in turn is putting 
pressure on third-country nationals whose asylum applications have been rejected to 
change track from refugee to labor migrant. In addition, because of the massive refugee 
inflow, there are many third-country nationals available for employment in Sweden. It 
should be observed that work permits are often not required for asylum seekers while 
their application is pending, or for guest students and individuals with a permanent 
residence permit (Calleman & Herzfeld Olsson, 2015).
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Due to the large inflow of refugees to Sweden in 2015 – 163,000 persons – resulting 
in extremely lengthy processing of asylum applications, the Migration Agency had to 
give low priority to work permit applications, especially in sectors subject to reinforced 
controls such as the restaurant and cleaning industries. That was a major reason why 
relatively few work permits were granted in 2015 and 2016 in these industries. The pro-
cessing of work permit applications was expedited considerably in 2017 and the number 
of granted new work permits almost doubled (Table 1). In 2017 after receiving criticism, 
the Migration Agency eased its control routines with a view to eliminate rejections based 
on minor employer mistakes. In the aftermath of the 2015 wave of refugees, the number 
of track changers from asylum to labor migrants increased fivefold between 2016 and 
2017 (refers to the whole labor market). 
In 2014, in Finland, 23% of all cleaners were foreign-born, followed by 18% of 
food preparation assistants (Ollus, 2016:27). These percentages are far below the Swed-
ish rates (Table 2). Ollus (2013:31) argues that the Finnish demand for foreign cleaners 
can be explained by the fact that the labor force is ‘divided into largely unavailable Finn-
ish workers versus available migrant workers’. Many native Finns avoid cleaning jobs 
due to unattractive working hours (and tasks) and uneven demand on labor. Although 
table 2  Employees born abroad by selected occupations in Sweden, 16–64 years: 2009–2015 
All  
employees
Born abroad Share born abroad
All Third countries All Third countries
2009
Hotel and office cleaners etc. 66,100 28,200 21,500 43% 33%
Food preparation assistants etc. 57,600 14,700 12,000 26% 21%
Cooks 32,000 7300 5000 23% 16%
total 2009 155,700 50,200 38,500 32% 25%
2011
Hotel and office cleaners etc. 69,800 32,100 24,600 46% 35%
Food preparation assistants 61,600 17,800 15,000 29% 24%
Cooks 35,300 9500 7300 27% 21%
total 2011 166,700 59,400 46,900 36% 28%
2013
Hotel and office cleaners etc. 71,100 34,700 26,700 49% 38%
Food preparation assistants 67,700 20,600 17,600 30% 26%
Cooks 37,200 10,800 8500 29% 23%
total 2013 176,000 66,100 52,800 38% 30%
2015*
Cleaners 74,500 39,300 29,900 53% 40%
Food preparation assistants etc. 67,700 22,300 19,300 33% 29%
Pizza bakers, street kitchen assistants, etc. 2700 1900 1800 70% 67%
Cooks 39,100 11,900 9500 30% 24%
total 2015 184,000 75,400 60,500 41% 33%
*: Not quite comparable with previous years due to changed occupational classification.
Source: Swedish Occupational Register.
72 Labor Migration from Third Countries to Swedish Low-wage Jobs Frödin & Kjellberg
Swedish office cleaning is mainly carried out during business hours (Refslund & Thörn-
quist, 2016:67), the share of foreign-born cleaners is considerably higher than in Fin-
land. In contrast to Sweden, 40% of all workers in Danish ‘general cleaning’ are from 
EU11, that is, from Eastern and Central Europe. 
trAcK chAngErs vErsus purE lAbOr ImmIgrAnts
In contrast to berry-pickers, hardly any labor migrants in the restaurant and cleaning 
sectors are seasonal workers. Most of them appear to stay for the entire two-year period 
during which the work permit is usually valid. If the permit is prolonged for another two 
years, the migrant can obtain a permanent residence permit after four years of work. 
This seems to be a strong incentive for third-country citizens to work in Sweden. Fur-
thermore, labor migrants are entitled to be accompanied by their family members, who 
have the right to obtain work permits (Emilsson, 2016:9). 
Individuals whose asylum applications have been rejected can change tracks and 
become labor migrants and thus remain in the country. Normally, work permit applica-
tions must be submitted from abroad, but this is not applicable to former asylum seekers 
who reside in Sweden and who have worked for at least six months under wages and 
employment conditions that are in line with Swedish collective agreements (Calleman, 
2015). Sweden is one of the few countries where asylum seekers have the right to work 
pending the asylum decision. It is also stipulated by law that the rejection of the asylum 
application must have been legally validated, and the application for a labor permit sub-
mitted within a two-week period after the rejection. By ‘changing track’ to that of labor 
migrants, asylum seekers can avoid expulsion.
In our study of new work permits granted in Stockholm in 2012, we found that 
a large number of asylum seekers or former asylum seekers did not fulfil the formal 
requirements for changing track to labor migrants. Nevertheless, they had been granted 
work permits. For example, even though the wage was too low or the work period 
shorter than six months, it turned out that they were able to change their track to 
become labor migrants. We classified such track changes from asylum seekers to labor 
migrants as informal track changes. Those who changed track in this way tended to be 
individuals who had resided in Sweden for a long time, and who had a long history of 
rejected asylum applications, appeals, and expulsion orders. In these cases, the applica-
tion for a work permit must be submitted from abroad.
There are several varieties of informal track change. One variety makes it possible 
to travel safely to Sweden to seek asylum there. In such cases, the work permit precedes 
the formal application for asylum. We classify this practice as an informal change of 
track. These individuals focus initially on seeking asylum and the work permit is only 
a means to come to Sweden and seek asylum from inside the country. This variety can 
be described in terms of double changes of tracks, for example: (1) asylum application 
pursued but not possible to make from Syria, (2) work permit application possible from 
Syria and other countries, and (3) application for asylum after arrival to Sweden. It 
would have been misleading to classify these persons as ‘pure’ labor migrants. 
Another type of informal track change is from residence permit based on a family 
connection (typically through marriage to a Swedish citizen) to one based on work. In 
this case, after a divorce, a work permit offers an opportunity to remain in Sweden. 
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In contrast to track change from family connection to work, former students who are 
granted work permits by the Migration Agency are classified as one of two formal kinds 
of track changers. The Migration Agency classifies work permits issued to third-country 
citizens into three decision-making categories:
•    ‘Employee’;
•    ‘Employee, former asylum seeker’, labelled by the authors as a formal track changer 
from asylum seeker to labor immigrant;
•    ‘Employee, former student’, labelled by the authors as a formal track changer from 
student to labor immigrant.
We label the two latter categories as formal track changers because the Migration Agency 
applies special rules for these, including that the application for work permit must not 
be made from abroad. Among the work permits granted in the category ‘employee’, we 
make a distinction between what we call ‘pure’ labor immigrants and the two types 
of informal track changers described above. Therefore, the category ‘employee’ can be 
divided into three subgroups:
•    Pure labor immigrants;
•    Informal track changers from asylum seekers to labor immigrants;
•    Informal track changers from family connection persons to labor immigrants.
The two types of each formal and informal track changers together exceed 40% of all 
labor migrants granted new work permits 2012 in the restaurant and cleaning sectors 
in Stockholm (Table 3). Consequently, less than 60% were ‘pure’ labor immigrants. Out 
of the 30% that changed track from asylum seeker to labor migrant, only one-third of 
them (10%) were formal track changers, while twice as many (20%) consisted of infor­
mal track changers. 
The various types of track changers created a strong demand for new work permits 
from third-country citizens who already resided in Sweden or had previously lived there 
for several years.
We found considerable differences in migration backgrounds when comparing 
occupations in the restaurant and cleaning sectors: 77% of the cooks and 85% of those 
that we label specialty cooks were ‘pure labor migrants’ in the sense that they had no 
history of track change (Tables 3 and 4). Specialty cooks are those with culinary skills, 
for example, sushi, Chinese food, and Indian food.
The high share of pure labor migrants among cooks prompted us to ask whether 
this was related to skilled cooks usually being considered as belonging to a shortage 
occupation. While only one quarter of all cooks changed track, half of all cleaners 
and food preparation assistants did so. However, there were considerable differences 
between the specialty cooks (making up the large majority of cooks) and other cooks. 
Despite the overrepresentation of pure labor migrants among cooks, and the status of 
cook as a relatively skilled occupation, other studies suggest that the cook occupation 
was not suffering a labor shortage in Sweden: this is explained below. 
In sum, there are two major types of third-country labor immigrants. The first type 
changes tracks to become a labor migrant and is already residing or has resided in 
 Sweden as an asylum seeker, student, or through a relationship with a Swedish citizen. 
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table 3 Granted new work permits by occupation and category in Stockholm 2012 


















































































































































All 57% --------------Total track changers: 43% -------------- 100%
*: Including chefs. **: In cleaning and restaurant sectors.
Source: project database.
table 4 Share of ‘pure’ labor migrants and ‘track changers’, respectively, in Stockholm 2012













Food preparation assistants 47% (79) 53% (88) 100% (167)
Cleaners 49% (82) 51% (85) 100% (167)
Supervisors (2) (3) 100% (5)
All occupations 57% (281) 43% (212 st) 100% (493)
Remark: Number of labor migrants within parenthesis.
Source: project database.
By applying for a work permit, this individual hopes to remain in or return to Sweden. 
A work permit can also be a way to enter Sweden in order to seek asylum. In the Stock-
holm restaurant and cleaning sectors, migrants who had changed tracks to the labor 
immigrant track made up more than 40% of the new work permits holders in 2012. The 
share of track changers rises to over 50% in the unskilled occupations of food prepara-
tion assistant and cleaner. Conversely, among cooks, track changers accounted for just 
over 20%, and among specialty cooks, this share was just 15%.
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cOuntrIEs OF OrIgIn: mOst FrOm AsIA
Two-thirds of the 493 labor migrants in our study came from Asia (excluding former 
Soviet republics). Somewhat surprisingly, the largest group of migrants came from Mon-
golia, followed closely by China and Bangladesh (Table 5). 
The strong concentration of labor migrants to a rather small number of countries 
suggests that the migrant flows are based on social networks.
When we combined citizenship with occupation (Table 5), we found that 61 cooks 
came from China, 23 from Bangladesh, and 16 from Mongolia. Many of food prepara-
tion assistants were from Bangladesh, Syria, Egypt, and Mongolia. Among the cleaners, 
many were from Mongolia. The restaurant personnel from China – almost all cooks – 
consists almost entirely of pure labor immigrants. Among the Syrians, track changers 
dominate. The labor migrants from Mongolia and Bangladesh also have a high propor-
tion of track changers, with all of the former from asylum to work, and most of the 
latter from studies to work. Pelling (2015) shows that for many Iraqis, a work permit 
provides an alternative to seeking asylum.
The labor migration patterns found in Stockholm deviate considerably from those 
characterizing Sweden as a whole (Table 6). At the national level, Mongolians did not 
top the list in 2012, but comprised the fifth largest group. For the entire period 2009–
2017, Chinese nationals were at the top of the list followed by Turks. In the third place, 
we find Syria, and in the fourth place Iraq.
EthnIc/nAtIOnAlItY lInK bEtWEEn EmplOYEr AnD 
lAbOr mIgrAnt
We also investigated how the migrants were recruited and how they learned about 
job vacancies, as these factors could influence the relationship between employer and 
employee. Of those who answered the question in the application document about how 
they acquired knowledge of the job, three out of four mentioned personal contacts 
table 5 Occupation by citizenship and type of labor migrants in Stockholm 2012
Mongolia China Bangladesh Syria Egypt Turkey Iraq Iran
Total number, of which 63 62 59 43 32 24 21 18


















- food preparation assistants 17  1 29 24 23 13 7 5
- cleaners 29  0  7  9 3 2 12 4
Total food preparation 
 assistants + cleaners
46  1 36 33 26 15 19 9
Supervisors  1  0  0  0 1 0 0 0
Share of ‘pure’ labor migrants 41% 98% 39% 19% 84% 83% 81% 78%
Track changers 59%  2% 61% 81% 16% 17% 19% 22%
Remark. Refers to new work permits in the restaurant and cleaning sectors. 
Source: project database.
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table 6 The 10 most common countries of origin, 2009–2017 (new work permits, Sweden)
2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013
1 China 295 Turkey 434 Turkey 392 China 244 (62) Syria 222
2 Turkey 187 China 400 China 301 Turkey 240 (24) China 218
3 Thailand 130 Iraq 145 Syria 223 Syria 176 (43) Turkey 162
4 Bangladesh 100 Thailand 143 Iraq 196 Iraq 148 (21) Thailand 159
5 Iraq 60 Syria142 Mongolia 172 Mongolia 138 (63) Bangladesh 134
6 Pakistan 58 Mongolia 130 Egypt 145 Bangladesh 118 (59) Mongolia 108
7 Mongolia 43 Bangladesh 101 Bangladesh 124 Egypt 85 (32) Iraq 100
8 India 42 Iran 70 Thailand 110 Pakistan 81 (9) Vietnam 64
9 Iran 40 Vietnam 70 Vietnam 97 Thailand 79 (4) Iran 59
10 Syria 32 Egypt 69 Pakistan 96 Iran 77 (18) Pakistan 55
2014 2015 2016 2017 2009–2017
1 China 251 Turkey 235 China 186 Turkey 301 China 2377 
2 Syria 235 China 181 Thailand 109 China 245 Turkey 2283
3 Turkey 229 Iraq 178 Turkey 103 Mongolia 209 Syria 1248
4 Thailand 117 Syria 148 Iraq 100 Iraq 144 Iraq 1160
5 Bangladesh 101 Thailand 131 Vietnam 84 Thailand 139 Thailand 1117
6 Iraq 89 Egypt 86 Bangladesh 67 Vietnam 136 Mongolia 968
7 Vietnam 76 Bangladesh 82 Mongolia 53 Bangladesh 133 Bangladesh 960
8 Mongolia 55 Vietnam 75 Egypt 39 Egypt 105 Egypt 635
9 Egypt 49 Mongolia 60 India 33 Pakistan 71 Pakistan 532
10 Iran 44 Pakistan 43 Syria 28 India 60 Iran 475
*: Within parenthesis refers to Stockholm 2012.
Remark: Number of labor migrants in the restaurant and cleaning sectors.
Source: Swedish Migration Agency.
(friends, relatives, employers), while one in four had acquired information through the 
Public Employment Service or an advertisement. A few also mentioned recruitment 
agencies in their home country. According to Vogiazides and Hedberg (2013:193), such 
agencies are used fairly often by Chinese restaurant owners in Sweden.
To get a better understanding of the importance of social networks, we investigated 
whether the employer or the contact person in the company was of the same nationality 
as the migrant. The migrant’s citizenship was always specified in the documents, while 
we defined the employers’ national backgrounds mainly on the basis of their names 
(therefore our data are somewhat uncertain). 
There are large variations between different migration groups regarding the fre-
quency of nationality links between employer and labor migrant. For all Chinese 
migrants except one, we found such a link. For the Bangladeshis, the share was over 
50% and almost 20% for Mongols.
It appears that mainly smaller firms employ migrants through national or ethnic 
networks. Three quarters of the migrants in firms with one to four employees seem to 
be of the same nationality as their employer. This proportion drops gradually to about 
every second migrant in firms with 20–49 employees. Almost all migrants in compa-
nies with more than 100 employees lacked a nationality connection to their employer. 
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Overall, slightly more than half of all labor migrants appeared to have a nationality link 
to their employer.
Among the ‘pure’ labor migrants who came directly to Sweden on the basis of their 
work permit, more than two-thirds had a nationality connection to the employer, indicat-
ing that they had come in contact with the employer through a transnational network. 
Of those who formally changed tracks from asylum seekers to labor migrants, far fewer 
seemed to have a nationality link to the employer compared to informal track changers. 
EvErY sEcOnD lAbOr mIgrAnt WIthOut A cOllEctIvE 
AgrEEmEnt
We also sought to map some of the main characteristics of the firms recruiting migrants 
from third countries. Almost 85% of the migrants, and almost all cooks, worked in small 
companies, which in Swedish official statistics are those with fewer than 50 employees. 
About 60% of the labor migrants worked for employers with fewer than 10 employees. 
Of the 350 companies surveyed, 42% had signed some form of collective agree-
ment. More than one in four belonged to an employers’ organization and were there-
fore covered by sectoral collective agreements. Of the 215 companies with up to nine 
employees, only one-third had a collective agreement. Most of these were substitute 
agreements, that is, directly between the company and the union. Conversely, of the 32 
firms with at least 50 employees, 91% had collective agreements, of which almost 
all were national agreements. These variations between companies of different sizes 
probably correspond to what is applicable for the restaurant and cleaning sectors in 
general in Stockholm.
Every second labor migrant included in our study worked for employers without col-
lective agreements. Among food preparation assistants, this share was higher (Table 7). 
In contrast, only 40% of the cleaners were employed in firms without collective agree-
ments. Almost all hotel cleaners worked in firms with (sectoral) collective agreements. 
This might be explained by the fact that many hotels in Stockholm are rather large, and 
members of the Visita employers’ association.
table 7 Share of labor migrants with/without collective agreement by occupation
Occupation No collective agreement Collective agreement








Total restaurant sector 55% 45%
Hotel cleaners 11% 89%
Other cleaners 45% 55%
Total cleaners 41% 59%
Total 51% 49%
Source: project database.
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In 2012, almost 85% of all private sector employees in Sweden worked in com-
panies covered by a collective agreement. There are no statistical data available on the 
average coverage rates in the Swedish restaurant and cleaning sectors, but they could 
be expected to be lower, especially in Stockholm. While about 85% of all private sector 
employees in Sweden are covered by collective agreements, only 35–40% of all compa­
nies with employees have signed collective agreements. The discrepancy can be explained 
by the fact that most companies are very small, and the large majority of the employees 
are found elsewhere. Nevertheless, the fact that every second labor migrant in our study 
did not have a collective agreement for their workplace is remarkable, because work 
permits require wages and other employment conditions equivalent to those stipulated 
in collective agreements. 
Almost all the 250 labor migrants at workplaces without collective agreements were 
found in small companies (fewer than 50 employees) employing almost six out of ten 
migrants in our study. While over 90% of the labor migrants in the companies with at 
least 50 employees were covered by collective agreements, the coverage rate was just 
40% in those with 1–49 employees. 
the trade union assessments
The Migration Agency must consult with a relevant trade union, and ask for its opin-
ion about the wage and employment conditions offered in the application documents. 
Among the unions consulted were the Hotel and Restaurant Employees’ Union, the 
Maintenance Employees’ Union, and the Municipal Workers’ Union. 
The Migration Agency is not obliged to follow union recommendations and is not 
allowed to reject work permit applications only because there is no collective agreement 
in place. Approval for the permit requires only that the offered wage is not lower than 
the minimum level stipulated in the agreement, and that the employer provides the employee 
with sickness, injury, life, and occupational pension insurances. Since 2012, when more 
restrictive rules were introduced in the restaurant and cleaning sectors, the employer must 
submit payslips if the migrant already is or has been employed in Sweden. On the basis 
of annual accounting records, the Migration Agency investigates whether firms have the 
funds required to pay wages during the first three months. The stricter rules were applied 
before 2012 in cases of formal track changes from asylum seeker to labor migrant. 
In half of the cases, the unions found that the offered employment conditions 
were consistent with the collective agreement. In approximately 40% of the cases, they 
deemed conditions to be worse, and for 7% of the cases, they declined to comment.
Where a collective agreement existed, the unions considered the work offers in nine 
out of ten cases as ‘not worse’ than what was stipulated in the collective agreement, 
while only one out of five work offers from employers without a collective agreement 
was considered to be in line with the agreement. If the unions select the option ‘is worse’, 
they are asked to specify what ‘is worse’. In every third case, no reason was stated. No 
insurance or insufficient insurances was the most common reason (41%) followed by 
wage rates below agreements levels (10%) and the combination of low wages and or 
insufficient or nonexistent insurances (7%).
When unions assessed the terms to be ‘worse’ than those stated in the collective 
agreement, in four cases out of ten, they used the phrasing ‘there are no guarantees’ that 
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the employer provides a comprehensive insurance cover for the migrant (this percentage 
excludes union assessments not specifying what ‘is worse’). This share increases to seven 
in ten with the addition of assessments specifying that insurances are missing or defec-
tive. That makes insufficient insurance coverage the single most commonly stated reason 
for judging the offered employment conditions to be worse than those in the collective 
agreement.
In the form for union opinion, there is space for ‘further comments’. Above all, 
the Hotel and Restaurant Employees’ Union often included their own statement of 
‘approves’ or ‘rejects’. In all 137 approvals issued by this union, the company had a col-
lective agreement. In similar vein, 88% of the 185 rejections were motivated by ‘lack of 
collective agreement’. 
In any case, trade union comments did not seem to influence the Migration Agen-
cy’s decision-making processes. The agency ignored the fact that in 40% of the granted 
permits, that the offered employment conditions were considered worse than those of 
collective agreements. There is reason to exclude the Maintenance Employees’ Union 
with respect to the number of rejections, as it usually did not indicate rejection or 
approval of work permits. In its assessment of 322 granted work permits, the Hotel 
and Restaurant Employees’ Union rejected 49% and approved 37%. Nevertheless, the 
position of the Migration Agency should be viewed in the light of its assigned task: to 
assess whether the applications, in a formal sense, are in accordance with applicable 
legislation.
cOncluDIng DIscussIOn
In our study of new work permits granted in 2012 to third-country migrants in Stock-
holm’s restaurant and cleaning sectors, we found considerable demand for work permits 
from individuals who ‘changed tracks’ from asylum seekers, as well as former students 
and others applying for work permits to remain in or return to Sweden. In total, 43% of 
the new work permits were issued to persons who were changing tracks. Most of these 
track changers were recruited into low-skilled occupations, while a significant portion 
of the ‘pure’ work permits were issued to cooks, and in particular ‘specialty cooks’.
The recruitment of track changers was certainly facilitated by the fact that many of 
them were already residing in Sweden or had done so in the past. It is also reasonable 
to assume that track changers were keen to get a work permit to avoid having to leave 
the country. The many requirements to be met for a formal change of track from asylum 
seeker to labor migrant (Calleman, 2015) made an informal track change a realistic 
alternative for many individuals. 
For those who already had been deported after lengthy processes of asylum applica-
tions and appeals, the work permit provided an opportunity to return to Sweden. For 
some refugees, getting a work permit was a much safer way of travelling to Sweden 
compared to making the journey via risky smuggling routes.
Together with the track changers in all occupations, the cooks in the category ‘pure 
labor migrants’ made up two-thirds of the new work permits. The cooks accounted for 
almost half of those recruited into the restaurant sector.
At first glance, this appeared to explain why so many work permits were issued in 
the restaurant and cleaning sectors. The demand for work permits from track changers 
80 Labor Migration from Third Countries to Swedish Low-wage Jobs Frödin & Kjellberg
combined with a demand for skilled cooks appeared to explain the vast majority of 
work permits issued in the restaurant and cleaning sectors. 
Our hypothesis was that the recruitment of cooks from third countries occurred 
to satisfy the demand for employees in a shortage occupation. Furthermore, it seemed 
reasonable to assume that specialty cooks, of whom 85% were pure labor migrants, had 
specific skills in Chinese or South Asian cuisine. 
However, it is questionable whether cooks really can be considered a shortage 
occupation. Emilsson et al. (2014:50) and Emilsson (2016:11) classified cooks as a sur­
plus occupation because third-country migrants recruited as cooks often carried out 
unskilled work. Furthermore, statistics from Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Tax 
Agency showed that labor migrants from third countries who were recruited as cooks 
in 2009 had significantly lower incomes than ‘helpers in restaurants’ after two years 
(Emilsson et al., 2014:51, 54). Similarly, OECD found that the wages paid to third-
country labor migrants after the 2008 reform had entered into force were significantly 
lower compared to those paid to other employees (OECD, 2011:98).
A possible explanation for the discrepancies between stated and actual wage is 
that the employer and the migrant have reached an informal agreement to that effect. 
Axelsson et al. (2013) suggest that this may be the case for a large share of the spe-
cialty cooks, most of whom were recruited from China. Their study based on in-depth 
interviews with Chinese cooks showed that many of those recruited through relatives 
were not trained, and did not have relevant work experience before coming to Sweden. 
Wages varied significantly among the interviewees. The wage stated in the employment 
offer was typically about 18,000 SEK before tax, while the actual salary amounted to 
about 8000 after tax. The migrant and the employer agreed to this arrangement so that 
the Migration Agency would approve the work permit application. To fulfil the official 
requirements, the employer paid the tax corresponding to the wage stated in the job 
offer. Before the tightened control of the companies’ tax payments introduced in August 
2014, the Migration Agency noted that there was ‘a widespread abuse of the regulatory 
framework for labor immigration’ (Migration Agency, 2013).
According to Axelsson et al. (2013), many Chinese cooks were willing to accept 
a low wage to obtain a job in Sweden. Their actual working time was reported to be 
around 10–13 hours per day, six days a week. Cooks with permanent residence permit 
typically do not accept having to work more than five days a week. Once the Chinese 
workers had been granted permanent residence permits, owners of Chinese restaurants 
might have found it more attractive to recruit new cooks from China rather than retain-
ing those who were being granted permanent residence permits.
Another method of wage suppression for cooks was found by the Hotel and 
 Restaurant Employees’ Union in its 2012 investigation of 64 restaurants with collective 
agreements and labor migrants. It was not uncommon that cooks were given another 
job title, such as food preparation assistant to justify a lower wage than that stipulated 
in the collective agreement (HRF, 2012). 
In our study, two-thirds of the work permits were issued for food preparation assis-
tants and cleaners, that is, jobs with limited qualification requirements and where the 
competition for jobs is often fierce. Consequently, most recruitment of workers from 
third countries to the restaurant and cleaning sectors did not serve to satisfy a demand 
for labor in shortage occupations. As was shown above, this is questionable even in the 
case of many cooks. 
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In the light of the high unemployment in Stockholm’s restaurant and cleaning sec-
tors, the question is why so many migrants were recruited into low-skilled occupations. 
In 2011–2012, around 10% of the members of the unemployment fund of the Hotel and 
Restaurant Employees’ Union were registered as unemployed, and 23% when part-time 
unemployed were included. In the Maintenance Employees’ Fund, the corresponding 
rates were 7% and 17–18%, respectively. 
Considering the many unemployed workers available to recruit as cleaners and food 
preparation assistants in Stockholm and its immediate vicinity, the very frequent nation­
ality links between employee and employer appears to be a likely explanation why so 
many third-country migrants were recruited. It is possible that employers of foreign 
origin wanted to help conationals get a job in Sweden, while at the same time that some 
of them – in practice but not in the migration documents – offered employment condi-
tions which permanent residents were unwilling to accept. During this same period, 
many young Swedes preferred low-skilled restaurant jobs in Norway and Denmark that 
offered better pay.
Employers offering conditions below what is considered to be the ‘normal’ level 
are likely to experience a shortage of labor (LO, 2013:27). This hypothesis is supported 
by Andersson Joona and Wadensjö (2012) who found that recently arrived immigrants 
employed by conationals have significantly lower taxable incomes than others with 
comparable jobs. Furthermore, to a very large extent, immigrant entrepreneurs employ 
conationals who tend to remain in the ‘ethnic enclave economy’; this is confirmed by 
Urban (2013). This tendency has contributed to the emergence of an ethnically seg-
regated and segmented labor market. In our study, more than 60% of the employers 
appeared to have a nationality link to their third-country labor immigrant employees. It 
was most common in small companies. 
In research on ethnic companies in USA and Latin America, Portes (2010) highlights 
the importance of informal agreements and strong social control based upon personal 
contacts, ethnicity, and vertical ties between employer and employee in contrast to hori-
zontal, class-based solidarity. Under such circumstances, employees may be much less 
inclined to protest against poor work conditions and low wages. What Bauder calls a 
false loyalty to employers of the same ethnicity may prompt migrants to passively accept 
poor working conditions (Bauder, 2006:142, 154). 
While a nationality/ethnic affinity between the migrant and the employer may 
afford a sense of security in a foreign country, it may also put the migrant in a vulner­
able position. If the employer provides accommodation, as in the case of the interviewed 
Chinese cooks, another dimension of dependency is added. This is further accentuated 
by the scarcity of housing in Stockholm. In the restaurant sector, debt due to illegal fees 
paid to get an employment offer during the recruitment process is said to be common 
in both Sweden and Finland (Ollus & Jokinen, 2013:69–77; Vogiazides & Hedberg, 
2013:194–198, 213). 
The labor immigrants can be characterized as unfree workers in so far as the work 
permit is linked to a specific occupation and a specific employer. Free workers can change 
employer and occupation whenever they wish. The labor migrants do not even have the 
right to be unemployed for a longer period. Deportation will follow if the migrant fails 
to find a new job, and get a new work permit in the same occupation within a few 
months (after the first two years of work permit validity, however, the occupation must 
not be the same). One might say that the Swedish 2008 labor immigration legislation 
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‘constructs’ unfree labor. This contrasts sharply with the employers’ freedom to recruit 
workers from all over the world, provided that some, not legally binding, employment 
conditions are included in the employment offer document. According to the law, the 
employment conditions should be at least equivalent to those in collective agreements, 
but the very same law opens up for processes that threaten to put such conditions out 
of the running.
The combined freedom of employers and lack of freedom of migrants generates a 
very uneven balance of power, manifested in a precariat distinguished by both uncertainty 
and dependency on others. Under such circumstances, informal relations can strongly 
affect working and employment conditions, particularly as many labor migrants in our 
study were working in small companies where they had an ethnic/nationality link to the 
employer. The dependency is deepened by the linkage of the work permit to a particular 
employer. The employer can terminate the employment if the migrant expresses discon-
tent with the working conditions or tries to negotiate for improved conditions (Bonfati, 
2014:383). Migration researchers like Anderson and Ruhs (2012) argue that the absence 
of a permanent residence permit increases the pressure on migrants to accept working 
and employment conditions below the normal standard, especially in sectors with high 
unemployment such as the restaurant and cleaning sectors (see also Bauder, 2006:116).
Such processes of informalization are reinforced by the fact that the clear major-
ity of third-country labor migrants are not members of trade unions (Vogiazides & 
Hedberg, 2013:217–218) and that many are recruited to workplaces without collective 
agreements where the unions’ prospects for inspecting the employment conditions are 
more or less nonexistent. 
Some results from our study are as follows: 
•    The study revealed a high share of track changers (more than 40%) among those 
granted new work permits in the restaurant and cleaning sectors in Stockholm. The 
most common variety was a change of track from asylum seeker to labor migrant 
as an alternative way to obtain a permanent residence permit. This conforms to our 
third hypothesis about why so many third-country nationals were recruited to the 
restaurant and cleaning sectors in Stockholm during 2012. 
•    In accordance with our second hypothesis, a large share of the labor migrants – more 
than one in two – appears to have a nationality/ethnic link to the employer. This is 
most common among the ‘pure labor migrants’ (two-thirds of them) and especially 
among Chinese cooks. In the smallest firms (one to four employees), three quarters 
of the labor migrants and their employer were conationals. 
•    Numerous circumstances, among them the design of the regulatory framework, put 
many labor migrants in a vulnerable position. Because the work permit links the 
 migrant to a single employer in a particular occupation and expulsion will follow af-
ter a few months of unemployment if the migrant loses the job, very unequal power 
relations are created. Through the restrictions on the migrant which are inherent 
in the work permit, the legislation constructs employment relations which strongly 
resemble the conditions of unfree labor. On the other hand, the prospects of getting a 
permanent residence permit after four years of work certainly appear very attractive 
for both economic migrants and track changers from asylum. This combination of 
restrictions and prospects easily makes labor migrants from third countries subject 
to exploitation. Therefore, the absence of collective agreements and trade unions 
in the workplace will potentially have much more serious consequences for labor 
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migrants from third countries than for other workers.
•    Half of the labor migrants in our study were not covered by a collective agreement. 
In firms with one to four employees, this was the case for three quarters of the 
migrants. Only 35% worked in companies affiliated with an employer association 
and in firms with fewer than 10 employees just 15%. Along with the fact that very 
few third-country migrants are trade union members, this reinforces the migrants’ 
vulnerability, especially because the Swedish labor market model is distinguished 
by trade union access to workplaces based on high union density and high density 
of employers’ associations. In addition, union density in the restaurant sector is by 
Swedish standards exceptionally low – less than 30% among blue-collar workers. 
The absence of mechanisms extending collective agreements to whole sectors con-
tributes to many migrants’ positon in workplaces outside the model. Furthermore, 
compared to Norway, for example, the powers and authority of Swedish govern-
ment agencies to control workplace conditions are weak.
•    Union rejection of work permit applications does not appear to influence the de-
cisions of the Migration Agency. Behind the frequent union recommendations for 
rejection is a fear that the actual conditions in firms without collective agreements 
differ from the promised ones, especially because the latter are not legally binding 
and consequently no sanctions exist. 
•    Several indicators suggest, in line with our first hypothesis, that many employers 
take advantage of the vulnerable position of labor migrants, as described above. It is 
possible that employers seek both to help and at the same time exploit conationals, 
particularly in small firms without collective agreements. With respect to this situa-
tion, we have benefitted from studies carried out by other researchers, among them 
one study demonstrating that cooks in general are not recruited from third countries 
because this is a shortage occupation (cf our fourth hypothesis). 
•    In firms with fewer than 10 employees, three of four migrants were not covered by a 
collective agreement, irrespective of the existence or absence of a possible nationality 
link to the employer. However, among migrants with a possible nationality link to 
the employer, it was more than twice as common to be employed in firms with fewer 
than ten employees. Therefore, labor migrants employed by conationals were more 
often not covered by a collective agreement. This by itself puts these workers at a 
greater risk of exploitation. 
•    The sharp decline in the number of new work permits issued in the restaurant and 
cleaning sectors after the Migration Agency tightened controls – a move that pro-
longed processing times of work permit applications – indicates that many employers 
switched from recruiting third-country labor migrants to other channels.  Employment 
subsidies may have become an attractive option for employers seeking to reduce 
wage costs. The large inflow of asylum seekers in 2015 caused the Migration Agency 
to give low priority to work permit applications in 2015 and 2016. Fewer refugees ar-
riving to Sweden and more efficient routines for processing work permit applications 
are possible explanations for the high rate of granted work permits in 2017, which 
exceeded that of 2012. Another is the simultaneously rapid increase of track chang-
ers from asylum seekers to labor migrants. Finally, the booming Swedish economy in 
2017 may have meant that a shortage demand for cooks could not be satisfied within 
the country.
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